The purges have been brutal and spared no one. On the eve of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee plenary session, held from October 20 to 23, nine of the country’s top generals fell, targeted by corruption investigations. Among them was the number two in the Chinese military – second only to its supreme leader, Xi Jinping. He Weidong, 68, owed part of his rise to having served in Fujian province, across from Taiwan, when Xi held senior roles there. He had been promoted to the 24-member Politburo as recently as 2022 and, of course, by Xi himself.

Also removed were Admiral Miao Hua, who until 2024 was in charge of all political work, meaning loyalty and recruitment within the world’s largest army, and Lin Xiangyang, who was responsible, as commander of the Eastern Theater Command, for operations and preparations in case of war against Taiwan, the island that Beijing has declared an absolute priority.

If the Chinese military appears so deeply compromised at the highest levels, it is Xi himself who has exposed these vulnerabilities to the world, less than two months after a parade meant to showcase the country’s restored might. In 2024, China announced the arrest of two consecutive defense ministers, while in 2023, a sweeping campaign dismantled the missile force, which is also responsible for nuclear deterrence. To this list can be added a foreign affairs minister, Qin Gang, who disappeared from public view without explanation, and, more recently, an agriculture minister.

These endless purges could be seen as an admission of weakness, a sign of persistent systemic issues and the president’s inability, after 13 years of consolidating power, to choose the right people or put effective mechanisms in place. But Xi does not see it that way. On the contrary, the public display of purges demonstrates his absolute power, signals that his trust is never guaranteed, and that if the army – and therefore China itself – is deemed unprepared, he, described in propaganda as the “core” of the party, will remedy the situation, using strong-arm tactics if necessary.

“Preparation” is the key word for understanding what is at stake. The Chinese leader is convinced that the relaxation of elite discipline and tight social control led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Having come to power after three decades of openness that allowed China to modernize, but which he believes also produced its own ills – corruption, liberal ideas and the party’s loss of control over the individual – he has made it his mission to correct what needs to be corrected.

This rectification, which has no set endpoint, is considered essential by Xi for the party to elevate China to the top, as he has promised. That goal can only exacerbate tensions with the United States and thus requires a state of readiness. The once-celebrated policy of reforms and openness has ended, replaced by a phase of consolidation and fortification. The party, for example, considers that China must “achieve greater self-sufficiency and become stronger in science and technology.” This is because every external shock, such as the tariff war launched by the Trump administration, reinforces the Chinese leader’s conviction that it is essential to prepare for confrontation.